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S054868

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

KHALID IQBAL KHAWAR

)

)

Plaintiff and Respondent
V.

)
)
)

Court of Appeal,
Second District
2 Civil No, B084899

)

GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Defendant and Petitioner,

)
)
)

Los Angeles County
Superior Court No. WEC 139685

PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On August 31,

1989 Khalid Iqbal Khawar (Respondent)

filed

suit in Los Angeles Superior Court against Globe International,
Inc.

(Globe) and Ronald Morrow (Morrow), among others.

137.)^

(A.C.T.

In his suit, Respondent alleged that in reporting about a

book by Morrow on the assassination of Robert Kennedy, Globe had
re-published libelous, defamatory statements about him, damaging
his name and reputation and causing him harm.

(A.C.T. 139.)

After a trial, a jury returned a special verdict for Respondent
on April 15,

1994, awarding him $675,000 in compensatory damages,

^ A.C.T. abbreviates Augmented Clerk's Trauiscript, C.T.
abbreviates Clerk's Transcript, R.T. abbreviates Reporter's
Transcript.
1

and $500,000 in punitive damages.

(A.C.T. 2783,

2791.)

The

punitive damage award resulted from the jury's finding that
c’lobe's conduct had been negligent and with actual malice.
(A.C.T. 2791.)
At the beginning of the trial, a default judgment had been
entered against Morrow,
During the jury trial,

since he failed to make an appearance.
the judge made a determination that

Globe's conduct had rendered it the original purveyor of libel.
The default judgment against Morrow was thus vacated,

leaving

Globe as the only remaining defendant responsible for paying the
judgment.
(1996).

See Khawar v. Globe Int'l,
In a special verdict,

54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92,

the jury found,

98

inter alia,

that

the Globe article was an accurate and neutral report of Morrow's
book.

See id.

However,

the trial judge disagreed with the

jury's finding and a decision was entered for Respondent.
id.
Globe appealed the judgment of the trial court.

On June 5,

1996, Justice Gold, assigned to the Second District of the
California Court of Appeal affirmed the decision below.

id^

at 99.

The Court of Appeal's opinion reached a number of issues

of law,

including Respondent's status as a public or private

figure and whether Globe acted with malice.

See

The Court

of Appeal did not reach the question of whether California had
adopted the neutral reportage privilege.

2

id^ at 98.

On June

21, 1996, the Court of Appeal denied Globe's petition for re
hearing.

See id. at 92.

On September 25, 1996, this Court granted Globe's petition
for review.

See Khawar v. Globe Int'l.

57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277

(1996).
Statement of Facts
Khawar is a professional photographer, of Pakistani descent,
who has been in the United States for many years.
36.)

(R.T. 1330-

On June 4, 1968, he was photographing a speech by Senator

Kennedy at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles.

(R.T. 1388.)

During the event, Respondent stood on the stage very near the
Senator while apparently documenting the event.

(R.T. 1339.)

Upon leaving the hotel. Senator Kennedy was shot and killed while
passing through the kitchen.

(R.T. 1341.)

Sirhan Sirhan, a

Jordanian student, was tried and convicted for the assassination
of Senator Kennedy.

(A.C.T. 143-44.)

After the assassination, Respondent remained at the scene,
taking pictures of other victims.

(R.T. 1341.)

Respondent also

attempted to enter the kitchen pantry area which was blocked by
that time.

Id.

Life magazine.

Respondent attempted to sell those pictures to
(R.T. 1394.)

There is no evidence Respondent was

present in the kitchen where the assassination took place.

(R.T.

702 . )
In November, 1988, Robert Morrow wrote and published a book
entitled "The Senator Must Die."

(A.C.T. 140.)
3

In this book.

Morrow put forth a theory that the Senator was not killed by
Sirhan Sirhan, but by a group of Iranian secret police, acting on
behalf of the Mafia in the United States.

(C.T. 3145.)

The book

contained photographs and statements indicating Respondent was a
participant in the assassination of the Senator.
Morrow's book contained photos taken at the hotel the night
of the assassination, one of which was reproduced in the Globe
article.

(R.T. 1357.)

This photo depicted Respondent with an

arrow pointed at his head.

(R.T. 1359.)

Respondent was

identified in the book and Globe article as Ali Ahmand.
The April 4,

Id•

1989 issue of The Globe magazine contained a

brief report on Mr. Morrow's book,

the photo of Respondent,

and

its allegations regarding the assassination of Senator Kennedy.
(A.C.T. 139.)

Respondent became aware of the Globe article

through a former employee.
John Blackburn,
Morrow's entire book,

(R.T.

1357.)

the author of the article reportedly read
conducted an interview with the author, and

attempted to contact the subject of Morrow's book.
93,

1121.)

(R.T.

1092-

The attempt to contact the subject of Morrow's book

consisted of Blackburn calling Los Angeles Directory Assistance
and asking for a listing for Ali Ahmand.

(R.T.

1120-21.)

Pursuant to a Pakistani custom. Respondent would at times go
by his first two names, Khalid Iqbal, and at times use all three
names, Khalid Iqbal Khawar.

(R.T.

1383.)

One Kennedy campaign

worker said Respondent introduced himself as Ali Ahmad the night
4

of the Indiana primary.

Id.

Ali Ahmad was Respondent’s father's

name.
Respondent claims he suffered permanent and irreparable harm
from the publication.

(A.C.T. 140.)

Respondent testified that

his house was egged and his son's car was vandalized.
1367.)

(R.T.

Respondent claims to have received between 10 and 40

threatening calls between the time the Globe article was
published and the filing of the lawsuit.

(R.T. 1415.)

The assassination of Senator Kennedy took place in the early
morning hours of June 4,

1968.

(R.T. 1338.)

Respondent left the

United States for Pakistan in November of 1968.

(R.T. 1351.)

Respondent returned to the United States May 7, 1971.
1353.)

(R.T.

In 1977 Respondent moved to Bakersfield where he

currently resides.

(R.T. 1355.)

Respondent kept a picture of himself and Senator Kennedy,
taken the night of the assassination.

(R.T. 1357.)

picture was similar to that published by Globe.

Id.

Respondent's
Respondent

hung the picture on the wall of his Bakersfield office and
estimated that thousands of employees saw it there.
359.)

(R.T. 1358-

Respondent also kept a Time magazine with his picture on

the cover, depicting the assassination scene.

(R.T. 1392.)

About four months after the publication of Globe's report,
and less than a year after Morrow's book came out, Respondent
filed suit against Morrow, Roundtable Publishing (the publisher
of the book), and Globe.

(A.C.T. 137-41.)
5

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Is an individual a limited-purpose public figure when he
voluntarily‘involved himself in a nationally televised event
and later took affirmative steps to influence public
opinion?

2.

May Globe invoke the neutral reportage privilege as a
complete or partial defense to Respondent's libel claim?

3.

Can Respondent be awarded punitive damages without clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice?

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent is a limited-purpose public figure in the
controversy surrounding the assassination of Senator Kennedy.
Under normal circumstances a farmer from Bakersfield, California
would not be considered any sort of public figure.

However

unique facts in this case contribute to Respondent's rare status.
Respondent voluntarily thrust himself into the center of
events the night Senator Kennedy was assassinated.

He positioned

himself on the podium, a central location in a nationally
televised event.

Respondent was not present in the pantry during

the assassination, but tried unsuccessfully to push his way into
the area,

taking pictures of other victims which he later tried

to sell.

Finally, Respondent gave a television interview after

filing suit against Globe, attempting to draw on his status to
influence public opinion.

Respondent benefitted from his

orchestrated presence and close proximity to the assassination.
Regardless of Respondent's status, the neutral reportage
privilege should apply in this case, providing a complete defense
for Globe.

Persuasive authority and sound public policy support

the adoption of the privilege.

The privilege is an important

expression of the First Amendment.

A reporter should not be

denied the right to disseminate important information simply
because somebody else reported it first.
The privilege adopted by this Court should apply broadly to
public and private figures.

It should not be limited to reports
7

on newsworthy subjects, because a defamatory report is newsworthy
in itself.

Nor should the privilege be limited to re

publications of material from trustworthy sources.

Such a

requirement impossibly burdens re-publishers and has significant
potential to severely chill the dissemination of information.
Any decision by this Court carries substantial implications
for public policy.

Neutral reportage encourages authors of

■original works to take more care by clarifying the fact that they
will be fully liable for damages caused by their works and by republications thereof.

Most importantly,

the privilege supports

the basic goals of the First Amendment by encouraging the widest
possible dissemination of important information for public
consumption and judgment.

Globe strongly urges this Court to

adopt the privilege and thereby enhance and protect the First
Amendment rights of all Californians.
Finally, under no circumstances should the Court award
Respondent punitive damages.

Clear and convincing evidence does

not exist to support the finding that Globe acted with a reckless
disregard for the truth,
Therefore,

or knowledge that the article was false.

actual malice, which is required for punitive damages

cannot be shown.
using disclaimers.

Globe maintained journalistic standards by
Moreover, a failure to investigate is

insufficient to support a charge of actual malice.

8

ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONDENT IS A LIMITED-PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURE BECAUSE HE
THRUST HIMSELF TO THE FOREFRONT OF A PUBLIC CONTROVERSY AND
LATER ATTEMPTED TO AFFECT ITS OUTCOME.
A.

The Public Versus Private Figure Question Calls For
De Novo Review.

New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964),
declared that appellate courts must independently examine the
entire record,

including statements at issue and the context in

which those statements were made, in order to ensure libel
judgements do not run afoul of constitutional principles.
also McCoy v. Hearst,

See

42 Cal. 3d 835, 841 (1986).

Respondent is a limited-purpose public figure.

This

determination is founded on voluntary acts Respondent undertook
to influence events surrounding a public controversy.

This issue

is a question of law and fact, and thus a preliminary
determination to be made by a judge.
30 Cal. App. 4th 195, 203-04
B.

See Stolz v. KSFM 102 FM.

(1994).

Finding .Re.$pondent To Be A Private Figure Would Set A
Dangerous Precedent.

Respondent’s status is crucial to this case since it
determines whether negligence, or the higher standard of actual
malice is necessary for a compensatory damage award.
Furthermore, Respondent's status determination has a direct
effect on the right to free speech.

The First Amendment of the

United States Constitution serves to protect the vigorous debate
of public issues.

Respondent in this case undertook voluntary
9

acts related to a public controversy.
breathing space to flourish,

2uid

Free speech needs

finding Respondent to be a

private figure would encroach on this space, diminishing First
Amendment protections.

See New York Times.

376 U.S. at 272.

Respondent was involved in a very public controversy,

took

affirmative steps to thrust himself into the center of that
controversy, and later tried to influence the outcome of issues
related to that controversy.

Thus,

finding Respondent to be

anything but a limited-purpose or involuntary public figure would
cause publishers to steer clear of the unlawful zone to avoid any
type of costly litigation, not just unfavorable judgements,
generally Gertz v. Robert Welch,_Inc..
(1974)
C.

418 U.S. 323,

See

367-68

(Brennan, J., dissenting).
A Totality Of The Circumstances Test Indicates
Is A Limited-Purpose Public Figure.

A review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding a
controversy is required to determine whether an individual is a
public figure,

limited-purpose public figure,

figure, or private figure.
Court.

37 Cal. 3d 244,

255

involuntary public

See Reader's Digest Ass'n v,—Superior
(1984).

The unique circumstances of this case warrant Respondent s
designation as a limited-purpose public figure.

Respondent was

involved in the assassination of a United States Senator.
is an event that affected millions,
to affect new generations.

10

This

shaped history, and continues

Respondent is not accused of participating in the
assassination for purposes of this litigation.

However,

Respondent did everything in his power to position himself in a
central location the night of the assassination.

After the

assassination, Respondent remained at the scene, took pictures of
other victims and attempted to enter the kitchen area where the
Senator was shot.
pictures.

Respondent later attempted to sell those

Following the assassination, he was invited to meet

with the President of Pakistan, because he was "very prominent"
and doing well in the United States.

(R.T. 1412:9-13.)

Respondent became a limited-purpose public figure by virtue
of his voluntary actions on the night of the controversy and
thereafter.

This is true regardless of whether Respondent

intended to achieve such status.

"When an individual undertakes

a course of conduct that invites attention, even though such
attention is neither sought nor desired, he may be deemed a
public figure."
Cir. 1985).
F.2d 1072,

McDowell v. Paiewonskv. 769 F.2d 942,

949

(3d

In Marcone v. Penthouse Int ’ 1 Magazine For Men.
1086

754

(3d Cir. 1985), an attorney was deemed a limited-

purpose public figure for his association with bikers indicted
for illegal drug activity.

The court stated that actions of

plaintiffs were looked at as well as intentions, with a course of
conduct bound to attract attention being sufficient for public
figure status.

See id.

This is also true of Respondent whose

11

actions thrust him so far into a controversy he could have been a
witness in the criminal prosecution.
1.

In Gertz.
public figures.

Gertz V. Robert Welch. Inc, provides the three
original categories of public fiaure^s.
the Supreme Court described three categories of
418 U.S. at 342-45.

A general public figure has

reached a level of fame or notoriety which would make them a
public figure in any instance.

See id. at 342.

A limited-

purpose public figure is generally one who has attained a status
or assumed a role of prominence in society, usually thrusting
themself into a public controversy in an effort to influence
events.

See id. at 345.

The third class of public figure, an

involuntary public figure, could become a public figure through
no purposeful actions of their own.

See id.

these figures "invite attention and comment."
2.

In all three cases,
Id.

California courts look to the plaintiff's
affirmative actions to determine plaintiff_Ls
status.

This Court in Reader's Digest Ass*n declared that an
individual is not a public figure merely because that person is
involved in a newsworthy controversy.

37 Cal, 3d at 254.

Instead, a public figure must have undertaken voluntary acts to
influence the resolution of the controversy in question.
In Reader's Digest Ass'n,
rehabilitation center,

See id.

a foundation established as a drug

Synanon Church,

filed a defamation action

against a magazine which claimed Synanon made minimal attempts to

12

rehabilitate drug addicts, yet still solicited funds for that
purpose.

Id. at 249-50.

This Court held that Synanon was a

public figure, not because of a particular controversy, but
because of its repeated attempts to interject itself into the
public arena.

See id. at 255.

In Rudnick v. McMillan. 25 Cal. App. 4th 1183,

1190 (1994),

a rancher was held to be a limited-purpose public figure because
he encouraged a publisher to write about a public controversy.
In Rudnick. a controversy arose over who was responsible for
degradation of a ranch, Rudnick or the Nature Conservatory.
at 1186-90.

Id.

Rudnick talked to a publisher in an attempt to

defend himself and gain public favor, as did Respondent here.
This case demonstrates that Respondent's affirmative actions are
sufficient for limited-purpose public figure status.
These cases are important because they indicate that
affirmative actions are enough for public figure status.

These

cases also demonstrate that circ\imstances of individual cases can
lead courts outside of the Gertz model.
3.

Lower federal courts have found it necessary to
deviate from the classic Gertz model to account
for unique facts.

In Brewer v. Memphis Publ'a Co..
Cir.

626 F.2d 1238,

1257

(5th

1980), the court stated Plaintiff's status was difficult to

classify, thus requiring a resolution outside of the traditional
Gertz model.

13

Brewer was a singer and actress associated at one time with
Elvis Presley.

Ssg

at 1240.

Years later she brought suit

against a newspaper which published that she and Presley had a
reunion.

Ses iiL.

The court held that Brewer was a public figure

due to her own career and her association with Presley.
at 1257.

Alone, Brewer had only a modest stature as an

entertainer, with any career notoriety being of a local nature.
See id. at 1248.
Brewer did not fit into the traditional Gertz model since
she was "not tied to a particular controversy."
However,

Id^ at 1257.

the court declared that the Gertz categories were not

exclusive, but rather examples of cases where plaintiffs invited
"attention and comment."

Id... at 1254

(quoting gertz,

418 U.S. at

345) .
Although Brewer is persuasive authority,

it should be

considered in the resolution of the present case due to similar
circumstances.

Both Brewer and Respondent were lesser known

individuals associated with a very famous individual.

Although

Brewer may have had more of an association with Presley,
Respondent's brief association with Senator Kennedy was far more
controversial.

If Brewer's mere association with Presley was

enough to make her a limited-purpose public figure for articles
concerning that association. Respondent’s association with the
Senator on the night of the assassination should likewise make
him a limited-purpose public figure.
14

In Street v. National Broad. Co.. 645 F.2d 1227, 1229-30
(6th Cir. 1981), Victoria Street was the prosecutrix and
principal witness in a controversial rape trial involving racial
overtones.

Forty years later she brought suit against a

broadcasting company that portrayed her in a negative light.
id.

See

Street was held to be a public figure even though her status

as a rape victim could not be voluntary.

See id. at 1234.

The

court supported its holding by citing Street's access to channels
of communication in the past and present.

See id. at 1234-36.

Here, Respondent may not have chosen to be a limited-purpose
public figure, but became one by the nature of his presence and
actions on the night in question.

Also, the nature of the

controversy and of Morrow's accusations provided Respondent with
access to channels of communication which he voluntarily used to
his advantage.
4.

Passage of time is not an issue.

Passage of time was not an issue in Brewer or Street and
should not be one in the present case.

Brewer stated that

passage of time was not a problem with respect to articles
discussing her association with Presley since his career and
persona were still "phenomenal."

626 F.2d at 1257.

The same is

true about Senator Kennedy and this particular controversy since
videos and photographs of that night are still displayed every
anniversary of the assassination.
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In .qtreet. the court said passage of time does not "diminish
the significance of events or the public’s need for information."
645 F.2d at 1236.

The court noted that Street still possessed

access to channels of communication and said,

"once a person

becomes a public figure in connection with a public controversy,
that person remains a public figure thereafter for purposes of
later commentary or treatment of that controversy."
36.

Id^ at 1235-

This is particularly relevant here since time has not

diminished the significance of Senator Kennedy's assassination
and Respondent has had access to communication channels since the
controversy originated.

Furthermore,

the Ninth Circuit has

inferred in dicta that the passage of time has never been an
issue in defamation suits.
1152 n.8
D.

Partington v. Bualiosi,

56 F.3d 1147,

(9th Cir. 1995) .
Respondent's Placement Of Himself On The Podium And
Actions Immediately Following The Assassination
Constitute Voluntary Acts To Thrust Himself Tg The
Forefront Of A Controversy.

It is settled law that voluntary acts are required to attain
limited-purpose public figure status.
37 Cal. 3d at 254.

See Reader' s—Digest Ass—n,

The United States Supreme Court has generally

ruled on what is insufficient for a voluntary act.
Wolston V- Reader’s Digest Ass’Jl,

443 U.S.

157

(1979)

e_^,
(holding

plaintiff could not be a public figure solely because he was a
criminal defendant); Time.

Inc, v. Firestone,

424 U.S. 448

(1976)

(holding plaintiff was not public figure merely by being involved
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in a newsworthy event, a private divorce); Gertz. 418 U.S. at 323
(holding plaintiff attorney was not a public figure by
associating himself with a case sure to receive media exposure,
yet he never personally talked to the press).
Respondent went beyond the acts described in the above
cases.

Respondent benefitted from his place on the podium, a

place he actively sought where media exposure was more than
foreseeable.

After the assassination, Respondent did not move

out of the way, but tried to enter the pantry,
himself in an obviously newsworthy event.

further involving

As a result.

Respondent is a limited-purpose public figure due to his
involvement in the assassination, culminating in his contact with
the media.
E.

Respondent’s Press Interview Constituted A Direct
Attempt To Influence Public Opinion In A Public

In Denney v. E.^M. Lawrence. 22 Cal. App. 4th 927, 930
(1994), Roger Denney's identical twin brother, Rodney, killed his
wife and was convicted of manslaughter.
covered the crime.

See id. at 931.

The media intensely

Roger Denney sued Lawrence

for writing a letter to a newspaper, later printed, which
erroneously named him as the murderer.

See id. at 932.

The court held Denney was a limited-purpose public figure
because he gave press interviews, promoted a version of the case
favorable to his brother, and spoke to the press at a time when
his brother would not, thus making his information particularly
17

relevant and influential.

See id. at 935-36.

According to the

court, giving press interviews could not be considered anything
but voluntary since no one forced Denney to talk to the press.
See id. at 935.

Denney was a limited-purpose public figure

because he "thrust himself into the limelight and initiated
public debate on an issue of obvious public interest,"

Id. at

936.
Like Denney, Respondent voluntarily gave a press interview.
No one forced Respondent to go on a television program and give
his side of a story in an attempt to influence public opinion.
The principles of Penney must be applied in this case to prevent
an individual who uses his access to the media for his own
benefit from later hiding behind his private figure status.

An

individual who voluntarily seeks out the media assumes the risk
of public scrutiny.
Respondent,

Although Denney gave more interviews than

the distinction is unimportant in light of

Respondent's clear voluntary attempt to influence public opinion.
See id.
F.

The Opinion Below Failed To Take Into Account Relevant
Factors.

The opinion below did not look at all of Respondent's
actions, or consider the unique nature of this case.
said Respondent's '‘affirmative actions, namely,

The court

attendance at the

Kennedy campaign rally and appearance on the podium near Senator
Kennedy, do not rise to the level of action by which the
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purported public figure thrust himself into the forefront of a
public controversy."

Khawar. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101.

This

statement does not take into account Respondent's actions after
the fact, or his media appearance.

The opinion below also

erroneously indicated that passage of time would affect
Respondent’s status, contrary to case law.
G.

If Not A Limited-Purpose Public Figure. Respondent Is
An Involuntary Public Figure.

In Dameron v. Washington Magazine. 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir.
1985), Dameron was held to be an involuntary public figure.

He

filed a defamation suit against a magazine that claimed air
traffic controllers were partially responsible for a crash that
killed 92 people.

See id. at 738.

He was the only air traffic

controller on duty at the time of the crash.

See id.

Aspects of Dameron are very similar to this case.

The

accusations were similar in magnitude, Dameron accused of being
partly responsible for 92 deaths, Respondent accused of being
partly responsible for the death of a well-loved and well-known
American leader.
See id.;

Both articles were based on only one source.

(R.T. 1092-93.)

plaintiff's name.

Both articles failed to mention the

See id. at 742;

(C.T. 3145.)

The Dameron court distinguished Firestone as a divorce
proceeding thus being inherently private, even if the public was
interested.

Id.

By contrast, Dameron was involved in a public

controversy from the very beginning {public safety) , as was
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Respondent.

Sgg

(R.T. 1341-42.)

Like p^^rgn. Respondent's

case is one that is exceedingly rare due to the extreme nature of
the public controversy.

Through his in-depth involvement in such

a great controversy/ Respondent undeniably became at least an
involuntary public figure.
II.

PETITIONER URGES THIS COURT TO ADOPT THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE
PRIVILEGE.
A.

De Novo Review Is The Appropriate Standard.

Globe urges this Court to adopt the "neutral reportage"
privilege that has been adopted in other jurisdictions.
e.g..

Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'v.

Cir. 1977); Barrv v. Time.

Inc.,

1984); Ward v. News Group Int'l.
1990).

Inc..

584 F. Supp.

556 F.2d 113
1110

733 F. Supp. 83

(2d

(N.D. Cal.

(C.D. Cal.

In the opinion below the Court of Appeal,

despite lengthy

discussion of the fact that California has not adopted the
privilege, explicitly did not reach this issue.

Khawar,

54 Cal.

Rptr. 2d at 98.
As a question of first impression concerning the adoption of
a general legal principle for California,
of law.

"[T]he question .

.

this is a pure question

. requires an 'exercise [of]

judgment about the values that animate legal principles;' hence
that question is one of law which we review de novo."
University of Cal. Reaentg,

56 Cal. App. 4th 979,

(quoting Ghirardo v. Antonioli.
Therefore,

8 Cal. 4th 791,

984

Smith v.
(1997)

800-01

the privilege issue requires de novo review.
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(1994)).

B.

Persuasive Authority Supports Adoption Of The
Privilege.

"In one of the few instances where folk wisdom has been
directly enshrined in the common law, the apothegm '[t]alebearers
are as bad as talemakers' appears as the rule '[o]ne who re
publishes a libel adopts it as his own.'*

James E. Boasberg,

With Malice Toward None: A New Look at Defamatory Re-publication
And Neutral Reportage.
(1991) .

13 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 455, 456

While perhaps wise in some instances, this paradigm has

for many years proven troublesome for courts and legal
commentators.

The solution to this important constitutional

problem is found in the neutral reportage privilege.
1.

The original, narrow Edwards privilege is a basis
from which this Court mav begin in drawing
California's privilege.

The privilege finds its original legal footing in the Second
Circuit's opinion in Edwards.

556 F.2d at 113.

The Edwards court

adopted the privilege with some important limitations.
119-20.

Id. at

Edwards required that the charges reported upon be made

by a "responsible, prominent organization," be made against a
public figure, and be about a newsworthy event.

Id.

The re

publication itself was required to be accurate, neutral and
disinterested.

See id.

Other jurisdictions that have adopted

the privilege have modified or eliminated some requirements.
See, e.g.. Barrv, 584 F. Supp. at 1110 (applying privilege to
limited-purpose public figure party to controversy, eliminating
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i

trustworthy source requirement); Ward.

733 F. Supp. at 83

(applying privilege to limited-purpose public figure generally);
April V. Reflector-Herald.

46 Ohio App. 3d 95,

98

(1988)

(applying privilege to private figure party to public
controversy).
2.

Even the narrowest reading of the
not recTuire that the re-publisher
truth of the original report, nor
publications literally .repeat the

privilege does
believe in the
that reoriginal-

The Edwards court held that the First Amendment forbade
requiring the press to suppress reporting of newsworthy
statements simply because somebody else had reported them first.
Id. at 120.

The court held further that the secondary reporter

need not have great confidence nor undertake great investigation
into the validity or truth of the matters asserted.
"[T]he First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested
reporting of those charges,

regardless of the reporter's private

views regarding their validity."

Id^

Thus,

even if the

secondary reporter has serious personal doubts about the truth of
the original report, he is constitutionally protected if he
believes that his re-report is accurate and neutral.
The Edwards court also held that "literal accuracy is not a
prerequisite."

Id.

The secondary reporter simply must believe

in good faith that his report accurately represents the original
publication.

See id.

Strict requirements on the secondary

reporter to ascertain the truth or accuracy of the original
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report only serve to chill the dissemination of information.
Moreover, such requirements do not make proportional strides
toward protecting the reputations of those reported upon.
3.

Recent precedent supports aPDlyina the privilege
tQ^limited-Durposejpublic and private figures.

The privilege should apply to non-public figures as well as
public figures.

The Edwards court did not address reports about

non-public figures, and thus its holding has been narrowly
interpreted.

See id. at 120.

Later courts, including the

Federal District Courts for the Northern and Central Districts of
California, have explicitly broadened the Edwards privilege by
applying it to reports about limited-purpose public figures.
Barry,

See

584 F. Supp. at 1110; Ward. 733 F. Supp. at 83.

In Barry.

the court applied the privilege to statements

about a basketball coach made by a former player and re-reported
in a national magazine.

Id. at 1112.

The court reasoned that

the public has the right to know about and make informed
judgments about controversial issues which are of general
interest.

See id. at 1125.

The Barry court considered the coach a limited-purpose
public figure.

Id. at 1118.

However, the court stated in dicta

that "the rationale justifying the .
equally to [private] plaintiffs."

.

. privilege may apply

Id. at 1127.

Furthermore,

the

Barry court expressed doubt about the common interpretation that
the Edwards privilege applied only to public figures.
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See id.

”It has never been entirely clear .

.

. whether the [Edwards]

privilege would apply if the subject of the defamation were a
private individual."

Id. at 1127 n.20.

The limited-purpose public figure in Barrv is rather similar
to Respondent.

Moreover,

the issues in both cases are

controversial and of general interest.

Therefore,

it is

appropriate for this Court to follow Barrv and apply the
privilege here.

However,

should the Court find that Respondent

is a private figure, application of the privilege is not
foreclosed.
The Ohio Court of Appeal has explicitly applied the
privilege to a private figure.

See April,

46 Ohio App. 3d at 98.

The court saw "no legitimate difference between the press's
accurate reporting of accusations made against a private figure
and those made against a public figure, when the accusations
themselves are newsworthy and concern a matter of public
interest."

Id.

Similarly,

the Court here should construe the privilege

broadly to protect re-publication of reports about private as
well as public figures.
neutral,

If the re-publication is accurate and

then the privilege should apply.

Limiting it to reports

about public figures limits dissemination of information,
contrary to the fundamental tenets of the First Amendment.

The

knowledge that a reputable and possibly prominent individual or
organization has attacked the character of a private individual
24

is critical to allow the public to gain insight into the methods
and character of that author or organization.

Such an attack may

be more newsworthy than a story about a public figure.

The

privilege should apply to private and public figures alike.
4.

The privilege should not constrict First Amendment
freedom bv reouirina re-puhlishers to ascertain a
source*s trustworthiness before it is applicable.

The Barry court wrote forcefully against requiring the
original reporter to be trustworthy for the privilege to apply.
584 F. Supp. at 1126.

The court felt that the First Amendment

requires the public to be the "arbiters of how 'trustworthy' a
source is," because forcing that duty on a re-publisher is likely
to have a chilling effect.

Id.

"A much more sensible approach

is to extend the [privilege] to all re-publications of serious
charges .
defamer."

.

. regardless of the 'trustworthiness' of the original
Id.

Globe urges this Court to follow the Barry court's lead in
cleansing the privilege of this unnecessary and unwise
requirement.

The trustworthiness requirement places onerous,

unfair, and perhaps impossible burdens of time, cost and
feasibility on the re-publisher.

"[E]ven if [a secondary

reporter] does not fear ultimate liability, the mere threat of
costly and time-consuming inquiry into his state of mind may cast
a chilling effect on publication."

Id. at 1125.

Moreover,

trustworthiness is inherently a subjective quality,
determination of which should be left to the public.
25

the
See id. at

1126-27.

Elimination of this requirement allows for wider

dissemination of information,
the First Amendment.

in furtherance of the purposes of

The trustworthiness requirement does not

belong in California's neutral reportage privilege.
5.

Inter-iurisdictional consistency and.recent
judicial, trends support adoption of the pri.yil^q^.

Consistency of legal doctrines across various forums is of
great value to litigants.

Inter-jurisdictional consistency is

particularly important for news publications where editorial
decisions having significant legal ramifications must be made
quickly.

Fear of libel resulting from uncertainty about the law

results in self-censorship,
Amendment.

opposite the goals of the First

Currently the neutral reportage landscape is uneven.

Two of four federal district courts in California have adopted
the privilege, while the state courts,
Thus,

of course, have not.^

improving consistency across jurisdictions provides yet

another solid reason for this Court to adopt the privilege.
A growing range of persuasive authority supports adoption
and/or application of the privilege.

^ The United States Supreme Court has not decided this issue.
In
Harte-Hanks Communications. Inc.. v^Connaughton. 491 U.S. 657, 660,
694 (1989) (BlacJonun, J., concurring), the Court, noting previous
adoption of the privilege by numerous other courts, alluded to a
desire to address the issue and perhaps to adopt the privilege, at
least with respect to public figures. However, because the defendant
did not raise the privilege as a defense, the Court sidestepped the
issue.
See id. The fact that the Supreme Court did not speak out
against the privilege, and was at a minimum neutral to its potential
adoption, should provide further support for this Court in adopting
the privilege for California.
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In the last few years . . . courts have . . .
recognized the defense, either through an express
adoption of it or through a positive consideration of
it in dicta.
Many courts, too, have broadened the
privilege far beyond the contours created by a narrow
reading of the Edwards decision. These courts . . .
have read the Edwards decision as a broad protection of
. . . the [F]irst [A]mendment.
Scott E. Saef, Neutral Reportage: The Case For..a Statutory
pt-tvileae.

86 Nw. U.L. Rev. 417, 419-20

(1992).

Numerous federal

courts and approximately 20 state courts have adopted or applied
some form of the privilege since Edwards was decided in 1977.^’^
In summary, Globe urges this Court to follow this
significant body of persuasive authority and adopt a privilege
that is broadly applicable and protective of the First Amendment
rights of Californians.

^ See, e.q.. White v. Fraternal Order of Police. 909 F.2d 512,
528 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that although announcer used "dramatic
intonations" privilege could still apply); Price v. Vikina-Penauin.
Inc. . 881 F.2d 1426, 1434 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding recitation of
official action protected if accurate, even when results are clearly
harmful); Medico v. .Time. Inc. . 643 F.2d 134, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1981)
(holding that consistency required application of existing state law
privilege).

* See, e.q. . Gist v. Macon Coxintv Sheriff's Deot.. 284 Ill. App.
3d 367, 379 (1996) (holding fair and accurate reports of government
proceedings or activities of public figures protected, even if re
publication lacked literal accuracy); Costello v. Ocean Countv
observer. 136 N.J. 594, 626 (1994) (stating that "judges are ill
equipped to act as city editors" thus publisher must be protected
because of great public interest in receiving information); Herron v.
Tribune. Publ'q Co.. Inc.. 108 Wash. 2d 162, 171 (1987) (applying
privilege where re-publisher knows that original accusations are false
and the accused has denied the allegations).
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D.

Public Policy Supports Adoption Of Thg Parivileqe.

In addition to the precedential reasons noted above,

there

are numerous policy considerations that compel this Court to
adopt the privilege.
1.

The privilege is necessary to further the ..Fira^
Amendment goal of the widest possibly
dissemination of information.

"The public interest in being fully informed about
controversies that often rage around sensitive issues demands
that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges
without assuming responsibility for them."
120.

Edwards,

556 F,2d at

The free flow of information lies at the very heart of the

First Amendment, and of the privilege.
privilege restricts this flow,

Failure to adopt the

and in doing so diminishes the

vitality of our society's discourse and debate about important
issues.

See id.

Simply because a reporter may not be the

original investigator of a story,

or may even himself have doubts

about it's validity, he should not be restricted by the fear of
libel from accurately and neutrally re-reporting that
information.

See id.

Failure to adopt a broadly applicable privilege would result
in a law that protects "mainstream" re-publishers, while denying
those with narrower audiences and fewer resources the full
protection of the First Amendment.

This would reduce the

diversity of information available for public consiimption and
evaluation.
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The case at hand presents a clear example of this problem.
Globe is not a mainstream news source, and the assassination of
Robert Kennedy, while undoubtedly a major event in American
history, may not generally be newsworthy today.

However, this

topic is extremely interesting to a segment of the population.
Therefore,

in that context, Morrow's book is entirely newsworthy.

The fact that it may not be newsworthy in the broader context of
society,

should not mean that a report about it deserves any less

constitutional protection, or should be any less widely
disseminated than a report about the latest breaking stories of
general interest.
Limiting the privilege to reports about public figures
similarly denies a segment of the population the First
Amendment's protections.

An author or organization that

irresponsibly publishes libelous statements about private figures
should be exposed as such.
See id.: see also Barry.

That event is newsworthy in itself.

584 F. Supp. at 1127.

The very private

figure who is initially libeled is done a disservice if a narrow
privilege results in his being denied a chance to have the libel
that has been bestowed upon him identified as such.

"A member of

a civilized society should have some measure of protection
against unwarranted attack upon his honor, his dignity and his
standing in the community."

Edwards.

556 F.2d at 122

(quoting T.

Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment at 69
(Vintage 1967)).
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If the statements in Morrow's book are indeed libelous.
Respondent should welcome Globe's accurate and neutral expose.
The more widely the book is reported on,

the greater his

opportunity to refute the statements made therein.

The value of

the privilege in supporting the fundamental purposes of the First
Amendment is directly proportional to the freedom with which it
is applied by this Court.
2.

The privilege encourages responsible reporting
since a neutral re-publication is protected.

Adopting the privilege would encourage authors of original
works to take more care in their reporting and investigation.
See generally Saef, Neutral Reportage: The Case For a Statutory
Privilege.

at 426.

As it stands now,

an irresponsible author

whose defamatory work is re-published can pass on the financial
liability to the re-publisher(s).

Following adoption of the

privilege, authors of original works would lose this perverted
legal protection and thus be forced to take full responsibility
for any defamatory remarks.
This idea works in proportion to the potential for damage t ^
the reputation of an individual or organization.

The more widel;^

interesting or sensational the subject of an article,
likely it is to be re-published.
framework,

the more

Under the current legal

the fact that the original libel is widely

disseminated through re-publication means the original purveyor
of the libelous statements is financially insulated.
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Following

adoption of the privilege, the author of a highly defamatory
article that attracts significant re-publication will be subject
to great liability because he will have nobody with whom to share
the burden of his bad deed.

Defamation is most properly

addressed and prevented at the original source.
The case at hand exemplifies this justification for the
privilege.

The suit against Morrow, the original author of the

allegedly defamatory work, has been dismissed, and only the
innocent re-publisher, Globe, remains potentially liable.

The

absence of a privilege has allowed the original author to publish
what may be defamatory and damaging statements with impunity.
The privilege works to eliminate this injustice.

The privilege

serves both sides of the First Amendment balance; it protects the
free dissemination of information and the reputations of innocent
individuals.
E.

Adoption Of The Privilege Provides Globe A Complete
Defense To Respondent's Libel Claim.

The privilege provides a complete defense to Respondent's
charges.

The libel allegedly committed by Globe stems from its

accurate and neutral re-publication of statements and allegations
made in an original work by a reputable author.
article is not libelous.

Thus,

the Globe

Moreover, it repeatedly attributes the

allegations reported upon to the original, reputable author,
allowing any reader to properly identify the original source of
the allegations.
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1.

The Globe article was a neutral and accurate
report oi. Sorrow's book.

The Globe article was a neutral and accurate report of
Morrow's original allegations.

Of the 16 paragraphs in the

article, 7 are direct quotations and 2 are for the sole purpose
of attributing the information therein to Morrow.

(C.T. 3145.)

Perhaps more importantly, at trial the jury found in Question No.
7 of the special verdict that the report was accurate and
neutral.

(A.C.T. 2782.)

to the decision,

Although it was ultimately irrelevant

it is important to note that the original trier

of fact who saw the evidence and heard the witnesses found that
Globe's report was neutral and accurate.

Although de novo review

does not require deference to the factual determinations below,
it does not mean that they must be completely ignored.
Despite the seemingly clear resolution of this point,

the

court below found that Globe's inclusion of a picture from
Morrow's book and addition of a caption and an arrow pointing to
Respondent rendered it the original purveyor of libel.
54 Cal. Rptr. at 98 & n.l.

The Edwards court warned that re

publishers who "in fact espouse[] or concur[]
by others,

Khawar.

or who deliberately distort[]

in the charges made

these statements to

launch a personal attack" may not avail themselves of the
privilege.

556 F.2d at 120.

Adding a caption and an arrow to a

picture from the original work is far from espousing,
or distorting.

concurring

These additions clarify the original report and
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avoid possible defamation of other people shown in the picture,
who readers could mistake for Respondent.

Moreover, the caption

itself states that the allegations to which the picture pertains
were made by "author Robert Morrow."

(R.T. 3415.)

Determinations of the neutrality and accuracy of a re
publication must be made in the context of the whole article.
See Ward. 733 F. Supp. at 83.

"The [reviewing]

[cjourt should

consider the article as a whole and read the entire communication
in context."
article,

Id.

When taken in the context of the whole

it is clear that the annotation and the caption do

nothing to show that Globe supports or embraces Morrow's
allegations.

In fact, considering the article as a whole reveals

further that Globe's additions were clarifications of materials
set forth in the original publication, and that they actually
protected others in the picture from potential defamation.

In

all respects, Globe's article was an accurate and neutral report
of Morrow's book.
2.

Should this Court decline to broaden the privilege
in the various ways discussed above, it still
serves as a defense to Respondent's allegations.

Even if this Court adopts a fairly restrictive privilege.
Globe is protected.

The trial court considered the neutral

reportage defense and submitted instructions to the jury for a
decision pertaining thereto.

(C.T. 2832.)

to the jury was very restrictive.
jury had to find that,

The privilege offered

To apply the privilege,

the

in addition to the report being neutral
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and accurate, 1) Morrow was a responsible and prominent source,
2)

the statements reported on were newsworthy,

and 3)

the

reporter (Blackburn) believed reasonably and in good faith that
his report accurately conveyed the statements made.

(C.T. 2832.)

The jury found that Globe's conduct met each of these
requirements and thus the privilege should apply.

The fact that

Globe's report fit within this narrowly-defined privilege,

and

the fact that the court below was willing to go so far as to
submit these instructions to the jury, weigh heavy in support of
Globe's privilege defense.
As shown in Part I of this brief. Respondent is a limitedpurpose public figure.

However,

the privilege should apply to

reports about private figures as well.
Supp. at 1126; April.

See, e.q., Barry,

46 Ohio App. 3d at 98.

584 F.

This approach best

serves the First Amendment by allowing for the maximum
dissemination of information about important events and
controversies.
This limitation upon the privilege has met with severe
criticism from commentators who note that under some
circumstances the public may have a greater interest in
knowing that a prominent organization or individual had
made serious charges against a private individuaJ.,
since the making of such charges against a defenseless
plaintiff gives the public relevant insight into the
defamer's character.
Barry.

584 F. Supp. at 1127

(emphasis added).

Thus,

the status

of Respondent should not be a factor in this Court's adoption or
application of the privilege.
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III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAN NOT BE AWARDED WITHOUT CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE.
When the speech in question involves a matter of public
concern. Respondent must prove actual malice to recover punitive
damages.^
(1989)

Brown v. Kelly JBroad^_Co.. 48 Cal. 3d 711, 747

(quoting Gertz. 418 U.S. at 347, 349).

This is true

regardless of whether he is a public or private figure.

See id.

Constitutional malice requires a showing of subjective doubt
on the part of the publisher.

See Gertz. 418 U.S. at 349.

In

this case there is no evidence Globe entertained serious doubts.
In fact,

the publisher responded to the article by making the

language stronger.

This is evidence of belief and excitement

rather than doubt.

Further investigation would have been a sign

of doubt.
Gertz held states were not permitted to allow recovery of
punitive damages without a showing of actual malice for three
reasons.

Id.

First, defamation is an oddity of tort law where

compensatory damages are awarded without a showing of harm since
it is assumed from the publication.

See id.

This means juries

are unlimited in what they can award as compensatory damages and
compounds the potential for inhibition of the vigorous exercise
of the First Amendment.

See id.

Second, punitive damages are

^ Actual malice, also called New York Times malice or
constitutional malice is:
reckless disregard for the truth, or
knowledge of falsity established when "the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication."
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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St.

dangerous because they provide the jury with an avenue for

^

punishing unpopular publications rather than false facts.

This too, unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media

self-censorship.

Finally, states have no interest in

securing huge awards "far in excess of any actual injury."

Id^

The rsertz Court was attempting "to reconcile state law with
a competing interest grounded in the constitutional command of
the First Amendment."

Id.

The Court stated "[i]t is necessary

to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for
actual injury."
A.

Punitive Damages Require De Novo Review.

"Contrary to the normal rule of appellate review, a
reviewing court must independently review all the evidence on the
issue of malice."

Kelly.

rnnsumers Union of U.S..

48 Cal. 3d at 747
Inc..

(citing Bose Cgrp. v.

466 U.S. 485,

510-11

(1984)).

This principle is based on the competing interests of protection
of reputation and freedom of speech and was reaffirmed in HarteHanks Communications,
B.

491 U.S. at 686.

There Is Insufficient Evidence To Affirm The Opinion
Below On The Existence of Malice.

Respondent is required to prove malice by clear and
convincing evidence, a higher standard than most civil actions,
due to the importance of the constitutional protection.
York Times.

376 U.S. at 285-86.

Furthermore,
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in this

SB® New

constitutional area,

jury verdicts are not persuasive because of

the danger juries will decide an issue based on sympathy or
distaste rather than constitutional principles.
Cal. 3d at 844.

See Hearst. 42

Here, this standard has not been met.

Globe had a right to tell its readers about Morrow's theory.
A conspiracy theory is unique in that it is difficult to prove.
Globe could not even verify that Morrow once worked for the CIA
since the CIA would never respond to such an inquiry.
846.)

(R.T.

Morrow is no longer party to this litigation, yet Globe is

allegedly liable for merely reporting the existence of his theory
to the public.

Globe made every effort to distance itself from

the truth or falsity of Morrow's theory.

At trial. Respondent's

expert cited Globe's use of the word "revealed" in its headline
as irresponsible, yet he also admitted this could be attributed
to a journalistic prerogative or style.

(R.T. 865-68.)

are critical areas of First Amendment protection.

These

These facts do

not and cannot amount to actual malice.
The opinion below stated that Globe engaged in misconduct in
which a reasonable person would not engage.
Rptr. 2d at 110.

See Khawar.

54 Cal.

This comment implies negligence, not

constitutional malice, which requires that the publisher
entertained serious doubts about the veracity of a publication.
The opinion below also states that Morrow's assertions are
improbable on their face, providing circumstantial evidence that
the re-publishers had doubts.

This is a circular argument that
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provides no evidence of the re-publisher's subjective state of
mind.

Neither of these reasons provide clear and convincing

evidence of malice.
Failure To Investigate Is Insufficient To Prove
Actual Malice.

C.

Malice is not established by showing speculative or sloppy
reporting, a failure to contact the subject of a story for his or
her side,

or factual error alone.

Cal. App. 3d 129,

147

(1980).

See Weinaarten v.—102

A failure to investigate fully

could be a sign of negligence, but not a sign of knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard as required for actual malice.
A failure to investigate may reflect the subjective attitude
of the publisher.

See Reader's Digest Ass'n.

37 Cal.

3d at 258.

However, any failure to investigate here was a direct response to
Globe's perception that such research was unnecessary due to the
use of disclaimers in the re-publication and the reputation of
the original author.

Globe's actions infer confidence in their

article, not doubt.
Robert Morrow believed his source.

The First Amendment is

founded in the value of expressing and airing ideas that are a
matter of public concern.

Actual malice encourages open

discussion by tolerating "silly arguments and strange ways of
yoking facts together in unusual patterns.'*
1237.

Street,

645 F.2d at

No one would suggest Respondent was risking his reputation

by putting a picture of himself and Senator Kennedy on display in
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his semi-public office.

However,

the facts in this case are so

unique that without Respondent's voluntary act he may never have
been recognized.

An award of punitive damages in this case would

protect those who want to hide behind private figure status at
the expense of the public's right to hear discussion on matters
of public concern.

This would be a dangerous encroachment on

constitutional protections.
CONCLUSION
Respondent is a limited-purpose public figure.

He

voluntarily thrust himself into the center of controversial
events.

He used his presence at the assassination to elevate his

status and later used a press interview to influence public
opinion.

Due to the unique facts of this case. Respondent is a

limited-purpose public figure, although not of the typical Gertz
model.
Regardless of Respondent's status. Globe should be protected
by the neutral reportage privilege.

Many courts have concluded

that the privilege is an appropriate and responsible way to
uphold and further the goals of the First Amendment.

Numerous

legal and public policy reasons compel this Court's adoption of
the privilege.

It would be a bold statement of law and policy,

and a valuable safeguard for the First Amendment rights of
Californians.
This case presents an excellent opportunity for the proper
and just application of the privilege.
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Globe's report was

accurate and neutral.
public controversy.

The death of Senator Kennedy is a great
Morrow is a reputable author.

Therefore,

the privilege provides a complete defense to Respondent's claims.
Finally, the existence of actual malice is not supported by
clear and convincing evidence as required for punitive damages.
Such an award here would improperly hold protection of reputation
above the constitutional command of free speech.
In light of the foregoing. Globe respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the Court of Appeal on the issues of
Respondent's status, application of the neutral reportage
privilege, and the propriety of punitive damages.

Dated:

November 20,

1997

Respectfully submitted.
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